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Abstract
The  task in the computer  security domain  of anomaly
detection  is to characterize  the behaviors  of a computer
user  (the "valid’, or "normal’  user) so that unusual  oc-
currences  can  be detected  by comparison  of the current
input  stream  to the valid user’s profile. This  task re-
quires an online leaming  system  that  can respond  to
concept  drift  and handle  discrete non-metric  time se-
quence  data.  We  present an architecture for online
learning in the anomaly  detection domain  and address
the issues of incremental  updating  of system  parame-
ters  and instance selection. We  demonstrate  a method
for measuring  direction  and magnitude  of concept  drift
in the classification  space  and  present  approaches  to the
above  stated issues which  make  use of the drift  mea-
surement. An  empirical evaluation demonstrates  the
relative strengths and weaknesses  of these techniques
in comparison  to a number  of baseline techniques. We
show  that, for some  users, our drift adaptive  techniques
are advantageous.
Introduction
In this  paper we examine  methods  for learning to classify
temporal  sequences  of nominal  data as similar to or different
from previously  observed sequence data when  the  underly-
ing concept  is  subject to drift.  This problem  arises  from  the
computer  security  task of  anomaly  detection (Kumar,  1995).
The  goal in this  domain  is to characterize the behaviors  of a
computer  user (the "valid’,  or "normal’  user) with a profile
so that  unusual occurrences can be detected  by comparing
a current input stream to the profile.  This task presents us
with a number  of  challenging machine learning  issues  in-
cluding  learning  from discrete,  non-metric time sequence
data,  learning from examples  from  only a single class,  online
learning, and learning in the presence  of concept  drift.
The goal  of the  anomaly  detection  domain  is  to produce
an agent which can detect,  through observations of  system
state,  audit logs,  or user generated events, when  a user or
system deviates  from "normal’ behavior.  The presumption
is  that  malicious  behavior, especially on the part of an in-
truder who  has penetrated a system  account, will appear dif-
ferent  from  normal  behavior in terms of some  function of the
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present and historical  observations of system state  (Ander-
son, 1980;  Denning,  1987). In this  paper we  refer  to the in-
dividual observations  as events.  Taken  over time, the events
form an unbroken  stream of  temporally distributed  nominal
data.  Our work  focuses on an anomaly  detection  agent as  a
personal assistant that aids a single user in protecting his or
her account from abuse. The  alternative  approach, of char-
acterizing the system’s state  as normal  or anomalous,  entails
a somewhat  different  set  of problems  and is  examinined  in,
for  example, (Lunt,  1990; Forrest,  Hofmeyr, Somayaji 
Longstaff,  1996; Lee,  Stolfo  & Chan, 1997).  The learn-
ing task for  our domain  is  to form a profile  describing the
valid user’ s normal  patterns of behavior, and to use that pro-
file  to classify  incoming  events as belonging  to or differing
from the valid user. This task is  made  yet more  difficult  be-
cause the definition  of what constitutes  "normal’ behavior
for a particular user is subject to change  over time as tasks,
knowledge, and skills  change. We  envision the  techniques
presented here as working in conjunction with other meth-
ods such as  biometric  measurements  and attack  signature
detection to create an overall  accurate and robust security
assistant.
Because  the space of possible malicious behaviors and in-
truder actions  is potentially infinite,  it  is impractical  to char-
acterize  normal behavior as  a contrast  to  known  abnormal
behaviors  (Spafford, 1998). It  is also desirable, for privacy
reasons,  that  an anomaly  detection  agent only employ  data
that originates with the profiled user or is publicly available
--  an important criterion  to  much  of  the computer  security
community.  This requirement leads to  a learning  situation
in which  only instances of a single class  (’valid user’)  are
available.
In this  environment, the  anomaly detection  agent sees
only an unbroken  and undifferentiated  stream of  incoming
events and must classify  each event as anomalous  or normal.
The  associated learning task (training  the agent to recognize
a particular user) possesses  a number  of difficulties  not faced
by traditional, static  learning  tasks. In particular:
Concept  drift:  A user’s  behaviors and tasks  change with
time.  The anomaly detection  agent  must be  capable  of
adapting to these changes  while still  recognizing  hostile ac-
tions and not adapting to those.
Online  learning: There is  no division  of "training  data’
versus "testing data’.  Instead, the agent is  presented with a
homogeneous  instance  stream and must select  appropriate
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Single class  learning:  The agent is  only provided with
examples  from a single  class  (the  normal user’s  data)  for
learning.
Temporal  sequence learning:  Many  learning  algorithms
process instances composed  of attributes  and classes defined
on a fixed attribute  space. This representation  is not particu-
larly  amenable  to the unbroken  stream data available in this
domain. Either  a  mapping  from the  one to  the  other  must
be sought, or an algorithm designed  for the  native temporal
data space must be found.
In  other  work, (Lane & Brodley,  1997a),  we have ex-
plored some  of the data representation and single class learn-
ing issues  associated  with the  anomaly  detection  domain.
The  purpose  of this  paper is to explore issues associated with
online learning and concept drift.
Structure  of  the  Learning Component
Previously we  have examined  a static  model  of learning  for
anomaly  detection in which separate train,  parameter selec-
tion,  and test  data sets  are available (Lane  &  Brodley,  1997a;
Lane & Brodley, 1997b; Lane & Brodley, 1997c).  An online
learning  system does not have the  luxury of such distinc-
tions.  Incremental methods  are needed to  select  instances
for insertion  into the model  and to update current model  pa-
rameters. In this  section,  we  describe the structure  of the
learning  component  of  the  anomaly detector  and enumerate
the  methods  employed  in  our online system.
Token and Similarity  Streams The incoming stream  of
tokens (events)  is  segmented  into  overlapping fixed-length
sequences. The choice of  the  sequence length,  l,  was ex-
plored  in  (Lane & Brodley, 1997a) where it  was found 
depend  on the profiled user.  While  not optimal for all  users,
the  value I  = 10 was found to  be an acceptable compromise
among  the users tested  there.  Each sequence  is  then treated
as  an instance  in  an/-dimensional  space  and is  compared
to  the known  profile.  The profile  is  a set,  {T}, of previ-
ously stored  instances and comparison  is  performed  between
all  y E {T} and the  test  sequence via  a similarity  mea-
sure.  Similarity is  defined by a measure, Sire(x,  V), which
makes  a point-by-point  comparison  of  two sequences, x and
V, counting matches  and assigning greater weight to adjacent
matches.  Similarity to the profile Sirn{T} (z),  is defined by:
Sim{T )  (x)  ma Xy~{T}  Sim(x, y) Thisis th e 1-nearest-
neighbor rule of  IBL  on the  non-Euclidean  space defined by
Sire.  This measure, and some  alternatives,  is  described and
evaluated in (Lane &  Brodley, 1997c).
Comparison  of  successive  incoming sequences yields  a
similarity  stream  representing the similarity over time of the
observed  user to the profiled user. This signal turns out to be
quite  noisy,  so it  is  smoothed  with a trailing  window  mean
value filter  with window  length  w. Because  classification
takes  place after  smoothing, the  window  length limits  the
shortest time in which  initial  detection of an intruder can be
made.  We  choose  w to  be  80 sequences  --  the  minimum
window  length  that  we  have found to  reduce noise  accept-
ably. It  has been argued that an intruder can do a great deal
of damage  in  less  than l  + w = 90 tokens and that  alterna-
tive  approaches should be explored for  this  reason. While
the danger  of short-term  attacks is  undeniable,  there are also
large classes  of attackers  who  exploit a system over longer
time periods (see (Stoll,  1989) for one example)  and we 
ent our detector toward  such attacks.  Furthermore,  an alter-
nate branch of computer  security research focuses on pattern
matching  detectors for locating known  short-time attack sig-
natures (for  example, (Kumar,  1995)).
Classification  Classification  is  performed on each point
of  the  smoothed  similarity  stream,  yielding  a  value of  0
(anomalous) or 1 (normal) for  each time step.  Classifica-
tion is  subject to two  types of errors:  false acceptance  (in-
correctly identifying hostile  behaviors as normal)  and false
alarm (incorrectly  flagging normal behaviors). It’s  impor-
tant that  the false alarm  rate  be low for the system  to be us-
able,  but we  wish  to induce  as little  false acceptance  as pos-
sible  for that cost.  Because  only a single class is  available
for training (the valid user),  it’s  not possible to construct 
Bayes-optimal  classifier.  The  classification  rule we  employ,
therefore,  is:
1  if  P{T}(X) _>  class(x)  =  0  if  P{T}(Z)  < 
for "acceptable’ false  alarm rate,  r,  where  P{T}  (z)  denotes
the  probability  of  observing similarity  value x given user
profile  {T}. As it  turns  out,  all  P{T}’S  that  we have ob-
served are  characterized by a single  strong peak with low-
probability  noisy tails.  So, in this  case, the above-stated
classification  rule can be approximated  as:
1  if  train  <_ x  <_ tmax
class(x)=  0  else
where  train and tma~  are classification  thresholds in the sim-
ilarity  measure  space.
System Initialization  The question  of  initializing  an
anomaly  detector to a user’s behavioral patterns in a secure
fashion  is  a  complex  one and is  beyond the  scope of  this
paper. For the work  described here,  we  assume  that  an ade-
quate sample  (a thousand  tokens, in this  paper) of intruder-
free data is  available for the profiled user. In (Lane &  Brod-
ley,  1997b), we  show  empirically that  a thousand tokens is
often sufficient to characterize  a large, but not complete,  seg-
ment  of user behaviors. During  system  initialization  all  se-
quences are  automatically classified  as valid  and incorpo-
rated into the profile.  Sequences  are compared  to the extant
profile  before insertion,  however,  to  accumulate  usage and
similarity statistics  for use by parameter  and instance selec-
tion  methods  (see below).
To set  initial  classification  thresholds, the system  com-
pares  incoming  sequences to  the  current  profile  to  accu-
mulate a  similarity  value frequency histogram that  approx-
imates P{T}(X).  With  this  distribution  and an "acceptable’
false  alarm  rate,  r,  we  can calculate the decision boundaries,
tma~:  and train  such that  the a posteriori probability outside
the thresholds is  r.  For this  paper, r  was  chosen  to be 2%.
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ization,  the  learning system needs to decide whether  to add
the point to the profile or to reject  it.  This decision is es-
pecially  critical  in the presence of concept drift,  when  an
unknown  behavior pattern  might represent  the  valid  user
changing tasks  or  might represent  an intruder.  A common
approach  to dealing with concept drift  is  to incorporate in-
stances misclassified  by the  current  model  (Utgoff,  1989;
Aha  &  Kibler,  1989). Such an approach is  not appropriate
to the anomaly  detection domain  because  a training  signal is
not available  to the learner to inform  it  that it  has made  a mis-
classification.  Furthermore, storing  instances about which
the learner is  extremely  uncertain (i.e.  have  low  similarity to
the profile) as is done  in (Lewis  &  Catlett,  1994), has the 
tential  danger  of assimilating hostile actions into the profile.
Sequences  labeled as  abnormal  are,  therefore,  not included
in the  profile.  For the  sequences labeled  normal, we have
examined  four storage heuristics.  The keep heuristic  sim-
ply preserves  all  normal sequences. The converse policy,
reject,  refuses all  sequences. An  intermediate policy,  uncer-
tain,  attempts to focus on sequences  about which  the profile
is  uncertain yet still  labels  normal.  Under  this  heuristic,  a
sequence  is  assigned a probability of insertion as follows: if
train  < Sim]T } (x)  <_ tmax then,
tin. -  sim  T (x)
P~ns(x)  = 
trnax  --  train
otherwise,  Pin,(x)  = O, where Sim~T}(X)  denotes  the
smoothed  similarity  value of sequence  x with respect to pro-
file  {T}, and k is  a constant selected to make  P a probability
distribution.  The  final  instance selection heuristic  is  DAIP
(Drift  Analysis  Insertion Policy) which  selects sequences  for
insertion only when  a measure  of concept  drift  indicates that
the  profile  needs to  be updated. Measurement  of drift  and
the full  description of this  heuristic are deferred to the next
section.
Parameter Updating Learning  parameters  such  as  se-
quence length,  smoothing  window  length,  and classification
thresholds are all,  potentially,  dynamically  adjustable.  We
focus here on tmaz and tmln --  the classification  thresholds.
After initialization,  there are three methods  available for up-
dating the classification  boundaries. Entire recalculates  the
thresholds at  every time step from the similarity  histogram
of  the entire  profile  at  that  time.  Windowed  calculates  the
thresholds only from a window  of points  within the profile.
For this  work, we take  the  window  to  be the  same  size  as
the  initial  profile  --  1000  tokens --  and to  be drawn  from
the most recently  acquired sequences. Finally,  DATA  (Drift
Analysis Threshold  Adjustment), adjusts  the extant  thresh-
olds via a measure  of the concept drift.  A complete  descrip-
tion of DATA  is deferred to the next section.
Measurement  of  Drift
Concept  drift  can take place  at  many  time scales,  varying
from a  few tokens (perhaps stopping  to  read email in  the
middle  of writing a conference  article)  to change  over many
months (changing research  focus over time,  for  example).
At the shortest time scales,  drift  phenomena  are difficult  to
distinguish from noise. We  focus on drift  occuring at  longer
time scales  --  weeks  to months --  appearing as  changes in
the stream  of similarity-to-profile  measurements.
To  quantify one class of drift  effects,  we  calculate the best
fit  line  (in  a  mean  squared error  sense) over a  window 
the similarity  signal.  The  window  size is  chosen  to  be long
enough  to suppress most of the  noise effects  and yet  short
enough  to be responsive to the  scales of  interest.  We  have
found empirically that  1000  tokens is  an acceptable length,
but are currently  examining  methods  for selecting this  size
automatically.  The window  size  defines  the scale  at  which
we are  measuring drift.  Because we  have no wish to  adapt
to behaviors  "known’  to be hostile,  we  calculate the best fit
line  only over instances classified  (by the current model) 
normal.  The  coefficient of the linear term of the best fit  line
then gives us an indication of the general directional trend of
the similarity  stream, and we  take this  value to be our drift
measure, ~x.
We  employ  our drift  measure in  two learning  models (as
discussed in Section ).  In  the DA’rP  (Drift  Analysis Inser-
tion  Policy)  model, we employ  the  sign of  2x for  instance
selection.  When  2x > 0,  the similarity  measure  is  generally
stable  or increasing and the profile  is  doing a good job of
matching  current user behaviors. To prevent the profile size
from increasing  without bound, we do not insert  sequences
that  are already covered  by the current profile.  When  A < 0,
then the profile  is  performing  poorly, and so is  updated  by
inserting  new  instances.
The DATA  (Drift  Analysis  Threshold Adjustment) model
employs both  the  sign  and  magnitude of  A for  parame-
ter  estimation. DATA  begins with the classification  thresh-
olds,  t,na~(0) and train(O) selected  during system initial-
ization,  and updates them at  each time step by adding 7~:
t{max,min }  (i+  1)  = t{max,min }  (i)  +~(i).  Under  this  model,
the "width’ or discrimination of the thresholds (tmax -train)
remains unchanged  for the lifetime  of the system.
Empirical Evaluation
In  this  section,  we  describe learning models, data sources,
and experimental structure  and give results  evaluating the
learning models  previously described.
Models examined For time  and space  reasons,  we have
not tested  all  of the  twelve possible  combinations of in-
stance selection  and parameter updating policies.  Instead,
we  have focused on examining  each issue  (parameter updat-
ing and instance selection)  separately.  We  have constructed
six classifiers  based  on the previously described heuristics.
The learning  models we have examined  are  summarized  in
Table  1.
While some of  the  names  we assign  to  learning  models
have obvious  meanings (truncate  and  random),  others
bear  some explanation.  P-opt is  "pseudo-optimal’.  This
model  retains all valid instances of a user’ s behavior  and is
66Model Select Update
P-opt keep entire
truncate reject entire
W-opt keep window
DAIP DAIP entire
DATA keep DATA
U-ins uncertain entire
Table 1:  Learning models  as  combinations  of  selection  and
update  heuristics.
capable  of finding the best possible similarity  measure  for a
new  sequence given prior  experience.  As we will  see,  how-
ever, making  the best similarity  match  does not necessarily
equate to having the best  overall  performance. Similarly,
N-opt  preserves all  instances for the similarity  calculation,
but selects  thresholds  only over a  window.  Finally,  U-ins
selects  instances for inclusion in the profile based on their
uncertainty (i.e.  proximity to the minimum  acceptable simi-
larity  threshold).
Data Sources and Structure  Of the  thousands of  possible
data sources and features that  might characterize a system  or
user,  we chose to  examine UNIX  shell  command  data.  We
did so for two primary  reasons: first,  our interest  is  mainly
in  methods  of characterizing  human  behavioral patterns  and
command  traces  reflect  this  more  directly  than do,  say, CPU
load averages and, second, shell  data is  simple and conve-
nient to collect,t  Lacking  shell traces of actual intrusive or
misuse behaviors,  we  demonstrate the  behavior of the  sys-
tem on traces  of normal system  usage by different  users.  In
this  framework,  an anomalous  situation  is  simulated by test-
ing one user’ s command  data against another user’ s profile.
This represents only a subset of the possible misuse  scenar-
ios --  that of a naive intruder gaining access to an unautho-
rized account -- but it  allows us to evaluate the approach.
We  have acquired  shell  command  data from eight  differ-
ent  users  over the  course  of  more than a  year.  The data
events were tokenized into an internal  format usable by the
anomaly detector.  In  this  phase,  command  names and be-
havioral switches were preserved, but file  names  were omit-
ted under  the assumption  that behavioral patterns are at  least
approximately  invariant  across file  names. The  pattern  "vi
<file> gcc <file> a.out’, for  example,  represents
the  same class  of  action  regardless  of  whether file  is
homeworkl,  c or  cluster,  c.
Baselining the  system We  are  interested  in baselining  our
techniques  against  currently  implemented anomaly  detec-
tion  systems but it  turns out to be difficult  to do so,  as
we have not  encountered published  accuracies  for  other
anomaly  detection  systems. In  fact,  according to Spafford
1The  techniques  discussed  here could, of course, be extended
to cover any discrete  stream  of nominal  values such as system
call logs, keystrokes,  or GUI  events. Furthermore,  this classifier
could  likely be combined  with  classifiers based  on other measures
to yield a system  with higher  overall performance.
(1998),  with the  exception of  IDIOT  (Kumar, 1995), 
formance  measures  for  intrusion  and anomaly  detection sys-
tems have not been released in a  refereed publication.2 The
exceptions  to this  general state  are systems  with roots in the
machine  learning  community  such as  (Forrest,  Hofmeyr,  So-
mayaji &  Longstaff,  1996) or  (Lee, Stolfo  & Chan, 1997).
These systems concentrate  on examination  of  data  from
privileged system  tasks and are oriented toward  characteri-
zation of programs  and systems  rather than users--  a related
but distinct  task.  Lacking baseline  performance  data,  we
have begun a project  to implement  some  of  the  user-based
anomaly  detection algorithms  described in the security liter-
ature.
It  will also be noted that the false alarm rate for many  of
the techniques displayed below  are relatively  high. In fact,
these rates  are unacceptably high for  a standalone anomaly
detection system. We  envision the techniques proposed  here,
however, as only a segment of  a  larger  anomaly  detection
system, working  in tandem  with other detectors  (possibly in
a  meta-learning framework).
Adaptation to  Drift  Concept drift  in  the  anomaly detec-
tion domain  can only occur between  the valid user’s past and
present behaviors. Changes  in  the observed patterns  of  us-
age attributable  to another user are not drift  but anomalies.
Thus, we are  interested  in  measuring  two quantities  for  a
learning model: the  true acceptance rate  over time (repre-
senting the ability of the model  to adapt  to drift)  and the true
detection rate  independent  of time (representing the ability
of the model  to differentiate  anomalies  from drift).  To mea-
sure these quantities,  we  constructed 42 simulated "attack’
traces  for each user.  For each user we  began  by building six
"base’ traces of lengths one, two, five,  ten, and fifteen  thou-
sand tokens drawn  from that  user’s  data.  Each base trace
was then converted into  seven final  traces  by appending  a
block of one thousand tokens from each other user’s  data.
The  true  acceptance  rate  is  then the accuracy of a model  on
the basal part of a data trace,  while the true detection rate
is  the accuracy  on the final  thousand  tokens of a trace.  Ex-
amination  of true acceptance  across the basal traces yields a
view of acceptance  over time. Similarly, examination  of true
detection rate across the five time steps gives us an indica-
tion of a model’  s ability to preserve correct detections while
attempting to model  drift.
We  measured the  performance  of  each of  the  six  learn-
ing models described above. We  are  examining  two axes si-
multaneously in  these experiments: parameter measurement
and instance selection policies.  We  present results  for each
class  of learning model  in turn below. Merely  presenting av-
erages summaries  of  each technique’ s performance  over all
data sets does not not reveal the true structure of the space,
because such summaries  have high variances  for  this  do-
main. Instead,  we present extreme and characteristic  case
2IDIOT  is an intrusion detection system  which  employs  a pat-
tern matching  algorithm  to detect known  attack signatures  in audit
data. Its patterns  are not intended  to generalize  to unknown  cases,
so rather than accuracy,  time and  space performance  measures  are
reported.
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{[ Test ]  Elapsed  time (thousands  of.tokens) 
Model {tUserf  11  21  51  101  151
True  accept  rote (%)
P-opt  S 100.0 97.8 89.2 81.0 80.9
W-opt  S 100,0 97.1 82.2 "53.9 51.3
DATA. I  S "100.0 97.9. 89~6 83.3 84.2
True  detect fate (%)
U2 5.4 5.5 5.7 6.8 6.9
P-opt U4 52.2 52.8 54.2 54.7 55.1
U6 16.2 17,3 18.4 26.2 21.5
U2 719 10.4 6815 100.0 96.3
w-opt  U4 52.0 58’.8 73.9 100.0 79.4
U6 16.2 96.7 95.7 100.0 97.7
U2 5.6 5.6 8.9 I 1.9 17.0
DATA U4 52.6 53.0 5917 62.5" 66.8
U6 20.1 2712 40.2 94.4" 95.3
Table 2: Results for  parameter selection  models  on USERI’s
profile.
[[ Test { Elapsed  time (thousands  of tokens)
{Model  {I  User  [  1  [  2  [  5  [  10  [  15.J
r DAIP
True  accept  rate (%)
61.4 57.9
I trunc
S 100.0 93.9 73.1
S 100.0 94.8 81.4 78.7 80.8
I  U-ins S 100.0 92.2 75.2 65.7 62.9
True  detect rate (%)
U0 0.0 6.6 10.8  .]  23.6 31.2
DAIP U1 18.2 25.4 30.2 43.6 41.3
U4 57.9 66.5 65.2 64.2 -73.1
U0 5.1 5.1 5.1 11.3 5.i
trunc UI 11.3 11.3 11.3 14.9 11~3
U4 50.1 50.1 50.1 55.0 50.1
UO 0.0 1.5 1.2 12.2 16.5
U-ins U1 14~2 16.5 19.5 31.1 31.7
U4 62.3 65.2 68.3 69.2 67.5
Table 3: Results  for  instance selection  models on USER5’s
profile.
behaviors for  the various models  to  indicate  the strengths
and weaknesses  of  each approach.
Parameter  selection  methods Table 2 displays  relative
behaviors for  the  three  tested  parameter adaptation meth-
ods. Recall that  all  of these methods  use the "keep’ instance
selection  strategy.  We  find,  here,  that  p-opt  has strong
true  accept performance  but weak  true  detection rates.  Re-
call  that  P-opt sets  its  classification  thresholds based on
its  entire previous experience.  While  this  allows it  to recog-
nize a broad range of behaviors, it  has the twin difficulties
that  the  decision boundaries become  widely spaced (thus in-
creasing false acceptance)  and that it  becomes  difficult  to ad-
just  the decision boundaries  quickly in  response to changing
circumstance.  As an attempt to  minimize  the  second prob-
lem, we introduced the  w-opt model. This learning  strat-
egy also preserves all  known  valid instances for the purpose
of similarity  measurement,  but selects  classification  bound-
aries  based only on data from a window  of those instances,
While  W-opt  has substantially  superior true detect rates,  it
suffers  in true accept rates. 3 This model  is  setting  tighter
decision  boundaries than is  the P-opt model  and can adapt
more  quickly,  but is  unable to predict  changing  usage pat-
terns.  Analysis of similarity  value frequency  over the trail-
ing window  only gives W-opt  an idea of  where the  concept
was, not where  it  is  going to be. A useful balance is  struck
between the  two extremes by DATA.  This model begins with
the classification  boundaries  selected during system  initial-
ization  and updates  them  in response to the large scale mea-
sure of drift  described above. Again, the  update is  based
only on data from a recent  window  of  experience, but DATA
aGiven  a tradeoff, it is generally  preferable  in this domain  to
have  strong  accept  rates rather than  strong  detect rates. High  false
alarm  rate renders  the security  system  annoying  or unusable,  while
high false accept  rates only delay detection. This may  allow an
intruder to do more  damage  but, in the end, the intruder need  only
be caught  once.
has some  indication  of where the  similarity  value concept
will be in  the immediate  future.  Finally,  DATA  prevents the
decision region from becoming  too narrow by preserving the
initially  selected width  (i.e.  tma~:  - train is constant).
Overall,  we find  that  DATA  matches  or  outperforms
P-opt approximately 70%  of  the  time on both true  accept
and true  detect.  Conversely, w-opt beats  DATA  on 68%  of
the true detect cases, but loses to it  in 81%  of the true accept
tests.
Instance selection  methods  One  class  of behaviors for  in-
stance selection  models  is  displayed in  Table 3.  These  mod-
els  employ the  "entire’  parameter selection  method. The
truncate  model  is,  in this  case,  equivalent to  merely em-
ploying  the static  classifier  trained during system  initializa-
tion.  Its  true detect rate  is effectively constant; the varia-
tions observed  here are effects of the smoothing  filter  which
can "carry over’ high similarity  values from the valid user’s
data into the hostile  user’s data.  As the "valid user’ con-
cept drifts,  this  static  model  cannot adapt and true accept
accuracy  drops. The  "intelligent’  instance selection methods
experience a more  drastic  drop in this  case, in exchange  for
increasing  detection  accuracy. The problem here  seems to
be less in the particular method  of instance selection, but in
the fact  of instance selection itself.  All models  discussed in
this  paper accumulate  only instances  that  are  "known’  (by
the current model)  to be valid.  If  the current model  does not
encompass  a particular  change  in concept, then all  behaviors
associated with that change  are lost,  and the decision bound-
aries  become correspondingly  narrower.  As truncate  is
a static  model, it  is  not subject  to such loss.  Though  DAIP
makes  an effort  to  account for changing  concept, it  appears
to fail  for this  user.  U-ins performs  better  (in  both accept
and detect rates),  apparently  because  it  focuses  explicitly  on
uncertain instances and, thus,  accepts a wider class  of be-
haviors  than does DAIP.
The  converse  situation  is  displayed in Table 4.  Here DAIP
and O-ins are quite  effective  at  identifying  the true user,
68Test  Elapsed  time (thousands  of tokens)
Model  User  1  2  5  10  15
True  accept  rate (%)
DAIP S 100.0 91.5 92.9 95.3 96.5
trunc S 100.0 83.7 81.8 82.9 82.9
U-ins S 100.0 100.0 92.2 94.4 94.9
True  detect rate (%)
U3 95.0 81.0 93.7 69.8 52.9
DAIP U4 95.0 24.4 38.6 26.7 26.2
U6 94.7 41.2 50.0 37.6 34.9
U3 96.0 96.5 94.6 97.6 96.1
trunc U4 96.3 96.5 94.8 97.4 96.1
U6 95.7 95.6 93.5 95.6 95.2
U3 83.5 82.0 85.3 74.5 71.0
U-ins U4 13.8 21.8 27.8 33.2 34.2
U6 94.6 41.4 75.6 43.8 50.6
Table 4:  Results for  instance  selection  models on USER2’s
profile.
but are far more  lax in detecting  hostile actions. In this  case,
truncate’s  static  classifier  turns  out to  be more  accurate
at  discriminating  foreign  behaviors.  Now  the  narrow con-
centration of the adaptive methods  serves them, as this  user’s
behaviors seem  concentrated to a narrower class  and to ex-
perince less drift  than the behaviors  of other users. (Manual
examination  of the history  traces  verify  this  observation.)
Because  the  static  decision boundaries were not originally
selected  optimally,  truncate  is  restricted  to  a  more-or-
less  constant false  alarm rate,  while the other methods  are
free  to adapt to  more  accurate hypotheses. The tradeoff  is
that  there appears to be a certain  degree of overlap between
USER2’  s  behaviors and those of  the other users.  The  adap-
tive  methods  seem  to focus the profile  and decision thresh-
olds into this  layer --  as hostile behaviors are added  to the
profile  it  becomes  progressively easier  to  add more  hostile
behaviors  and the false  accept error rate  grows  quickly.
Overall,  we find  that  D/kiP  matches or  outperforms
truncate  in 52%  of the true accept tests,  but loses to it  on
true detect nearly 85%  of the time. Interestingly,  the cases
in which  D/kI P wins  are concentrated  into a few profiles for
true accept  tests  and a few  profile/attacker pairs for true de-
tect tests.  This  indicates that there may  be many  sorts of drift
taking place,  and that  the  DAIP  bias is  appropriate to only
some  of them. The disparity  is  even greater  for  U-ins who
beats  truncate  60%  of  the  time on true  accept but  loses
90%  of the time on true detect tests.
Conclusions
We  have examined  some  of the difficulties  involved in track-
ing user behaviors  over time for use in the computer  security
task of anomaly  detection.  We  demonstrated  an online learn-
ing system  for this  domain,  and described some  of the issues
inherent in incremental learning with no training  signal.  In
particular,  we  investigated techniques for updating hypothe-
sis  parameters  and selecting instances for insertion  into the
user profile.  We  found  that,  although  there is high variability
in the  strengths  and weaknesses  of  the various techniques,
intelligent  methods  exist  for each of these areas.  A measure
of drift  based on estimating its  magnitude  and direction  in
a continuous, 1-D feature  space was  found to be useful (in
up to 70%  of  the  cases)  both for  updating parameters and
for selecting instances for inclusion in the profile.  An  in-
stance selection  method  based on uncertainty  sampling  was
also found to have areas of strength.
The  high variability  in regions of effectiveness of the var-
ious techniques suggests two possible directions  for future
work  in this  area.  First,  we  hope  to be able to exploit com-
plementary strengths  in  different  learning models through
the  use of  hybrid systems. In  this  paper we investigated
each phase of  the overall  learning model  (parameter selec-
tion and instance selection) separately. Our  hope  is  that  in-
telligent  combination  of  techniques from each can lead to a
stronger  overall  system. The second avenue of exploration
is  to attempt to exploit overlapping  strengths through a form
of  meta-learning.  We  have observed that  some techniques
(truncate  and DATA,  for  example) yield  generally  uncor-
related  results,  making  them tempting models  for  use with
meta-learning.
Finally,  we  are interested in examining  more  sophisticated
measurements of  concept  drift.  The measurement used in
this  paper only tracks  the general direction  and amount  of
change of the concept of interest.  We  would  also like  to be
able to track and predict the complete  envelope  of the clas-
sification  region, as well as other system  parameters  such as
window  lengths and profile  size.
In conclusion,  we have presented  methods  for  an online
learning system  for anomaly  detection.  Although  error  rates
are too high to be of use for a standalone  system, in combina-
tion with other user classification techniques  such as biomet-
ric  measurements  or model-based  behavioral analysis,  these
techniques  may  form a valuable part of a robust security sys-
tem.
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